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Abstract 
During the interbank market freeze following the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 
2008, Denmark’s central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, used a series of unconventional 
monetary policy instruments to increase market liquidity. One such action included the 
introduction of the excess-capital temporary credit facility, also known as the solvency 
scheme. Under this facility, credit lines from Danmarks Nationalbank could be provided to 
banks and mortgage-credit institutions on the basis of their excess capital adequacy, 
calculated as the difference between their base capital and their capital need. The purpose 
of this facility was to ease the tight liquidity situation by providing access to credit directly 
from Danmarks Nationalbank, thus aiding the liquidity of banks with adequate capital but 
insufficient assets that are eligible as collateral. The program ran from September 26, 2008, 
to February 26, 2011, after being extended twice. The facility effectively assisted some banks 
with their statutory liquidity requirements, and few banks had to draw on their credit lines 
throughout the duration of the program.  
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1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 








At a Glance  
During the interbank market freeze 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008, Denmark’s central 
bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, used a 
series of unconventional monetary policy 
instruments to increase market liquidity. 
One such action included the introduction 
of the excess-capital temporary credit 
facility, also known as the solvency scheme. 
Under this facility, credit lines from 
Danmarks Nationalbank could be provided 
to banks and mortgage-credit institutions 
on the basis of their excess capital 
adequacy, calculated as the difference 
between their base capital and their capital 
need. The purpose of this facility was to 
ease the tight liquidity situation by 
providing access to credit directly from 
Danmarks Nationalbank, thus aiding the 
liquidity of banks with adequate capital but 
with insufficient assets that are eligible as 
collateral. The program ran from 
September 26, 2008, to February 26, 2011, 
after being extended twice. 
Summary Evaluation 
The program assisted some banks with their statutory liquidity requirements, and few banks 
had to draw on their credit lines. Both the Danish government and critics agree that the lack 
of usage of temporary credit facilities in Denmark was in part due to the more successful and 
more widely used bank rescue packages that guaranteed interbank loans.  
  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To increase access to loans from Danmarks 
Nationalbank to support liquidity of banks. 
Announcement Date   September 26, 2008 
Operational Date September 26, 2008 
End of Issuance 
Window 
Jan. 30, 2009 (initial) 
Sept. 30, 2010 (second) 
Feb. 26, 2011 (final) 
Legal Authority N/A 
Peak Utilization About DKK14 billion taken 
out in credit lines but rarely 
utilized (exact number 
pending) 
Participants  Several (exact number 
pending) 
Administrators Danmarks Nationalbank 
Denmark Excess-Capital Facility 
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$355.62 billion in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
GDP per capita 
 
 
$64,322 per capita in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Sovereign credit rating (5-
year senior debt) 
 






Size of banking system 
 
 
$750.5 billion in total assets 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Size of banking system as 
a percentage of GDP 
 
211.04% in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Size of banking system as 
a percentage of financial 
system 
 
Data not available for given year 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
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5-bank concentration of 
banking system 
 
89% of total banking assets in 2008 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
 
Foreign involvement in 
banking system 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
 
Government ownership of 
banking system 
 
1% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
Source: Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends and 
Implications” 
 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $133,333 in 2010 









I.  Overview 
Background 
During the interbank market freeze of September 2008, Denmark’s central bank, Danmarks 
Nationalbank, used a series of unconventional monetary policy instruments to increase 
market liquidity. As part of these measures, the central bank created two temporary credit 
facilities: first the loan-bills facility and later the excess-capital facility, also known as the 
solvency scheme. In addition, it expanded the collateral base for loans from Danmarks 
Nationalbank to include more securities than were normally eligible as collateral.3 These 
steps were taken to “prevent solvent banks from experiencing difficulties due to insufficient 
liquidity” (Financial Stability 2009, 1st half, 18). 
The loan-bills temporary credit facility was first implemented in May 2008, before the Global 
Financial Crisis and the interbank market freeze had truly hit Denmark. By contrast, the 
excess-capital facility was implemented months later, in September 2008, driven in part by 
the initial failure of the loan-bill scheme to meet banking needs that were intensified after 
the fall of Lehman Brothers. A 2009 report from Danmarks Nationalbank elaborates on this 
disappointment, noting that the loan-bill scheme “assume[d] that the banking institutions 
want to lend to each other,” however, “confidence among the banking institutions weakened 
during the summer of 2008 as the scope of the problems in the financial sector became more 
apparent” (Financial Stability 2009, 1st half, 19).   
The purpose of the excess-capital facility in particular was to prevent banking institutions 
with adequate capital from incurring liquidity problems as a result of insufficient assets that 
could be pledged as collateral to Danmarks Nationalbank. Unlike the loan-bill scheme, the 
solvency scheme was meant to help institutions access loans raised directly from Danmarks 
Nationalbank—not from other banks. To achieve this, the excess-capital facility allowed 
Danmarks Nationalbank to offer uncollateralized credit in the form of credit lines, the value 
of which depended on the applying institutions’ excess capital adequacy (FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 2009, 1st half, 20). The credit line could be counted toward the institution’s 
statutory liquidity requirement (Financial Stability 2010, 66). 
Program Description 
On September 26, 2008, Denmark introduced its second temporary credit facility in 
response to the Global Financial Crisis: the excess-capital facility. This facility provided credit 
to banks and mortgage-credit institutes on the basis of their excess capital adequacy, 
calculated as the difference between their base capital and their capital need. Financial 
institutions had to apply for a credit line; successful applications were then granted credit 
lines by the Board of Governors of Danmarks Nationalbank. The credit line was calculated as 
an institution's excess capital adequacy less a margin of one percentage point, usually up to 
a maximum of DKK800 million. On Fridays, banks and mortgage-credit institutes could 
receive seven-day loans at Danmarks Nationalbank within the credit line. 
 
3 During the financial crisis, the collateral base for loans from Danmarks Nationalbank to financial institutions 
was temporarily expanded to include special loan bills, quoted and unquoted shares, investment fund shares, 
bank bonds with government guarantee, as well as special purpose vehicle (SPV) bonds issued on the basis of 
government-guaranteed loans to the institutions (Financial Stability 2010, 66). 
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If an institution chose to exercise the credit commitment, it had to pay an interest rate 
corresponding to Danmarks Nationalbank’s lending rate plus a premium. The interest rate 
was initially fixed as Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus two percentage 
points. On March 13, 2009, the interest was reduced to Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual 
lending rate plus one percentage point, a decision driven by a general downward trend in 
interest rates. On April 8, 2010, the interest rate was changed a third and final time to 
Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus two percentage points, a change that came 
into effect on October 1, 2010. 
The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority stated that access to excess-capital credit lines 
could be included as part of an institution’s statutory liquidity, cf. Section 152 of the Danish 
Financial Business Act, until one month before the expiry of the facility. The expiration date 
subsequently changed twice. When it was introduced in September 2008, the excess-capital 
credit facility was initially set to expire on January 30, 2009. On October 7, 2008, it was 
extended to September 30, 2010. On April 8, 2010, the facility was further extended until 
February 26, 2011. On February 26, 2011, the credit facility on the basis of excess capital 
adequacy expired.  
Outcomes 
Usage of the scheme remained low throughout its existence. In 2009, Denmark reported that 
“new temporary credit facilities” had “led to a significant relaxation of Danmarks 
Nationalbank’s extension of credit to banks and mortgage-credit institutes compared to the 
framework for credit operations that applied prior to the onset of the crisis” (Financial 
Stability 2009, 1st half). The central bank had established DKK14 billion in credit lines based 
on the solvency scheme by the end of April 2009, distributed across 35 banking institutions 
(Danmarks Nationalbank 2009, 1st half, 21). Credit lines totaled DKK12.4 billion at the end 
of April 2010 (Danmarks Nationalbank 2010, 65). Credit lines were drawn on for loans only 
a few times; the exact number of times has not yet been identified. But the central bank 
emphasized that the point of the program was to reassure markets about the liquidity of 
banking institutions. The excess-capital scheme helped 35 institutions meet the liquidity 
requirements under Section 152 of the Danish Financial Business Act. 
After the first wave of temporary credit facilities and expansion of collateral expired in 
February 2011, a partial reintroduction of the temporary collateral expansion was put into 
place on August 10, 2011. It allowed banks and mortgage-credit institutes to pledge certain 
shares in jointly owned corporations as collateral with Danmarks Nationalbank. This policy 
expired on July 1, 2014.  
II. Key Design Decisions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
1. On September 26, 2008, Denmark introduced its second credit facility in response 
to the financial crisis based on institutions’ calculated excess capital. 
The first temporary credit facility was the loan-bills scheme, introduced in May 2008. The 
excess-capital facility was implemented months later, in September 2008, driven in part by 
the initial failure of the loan-bill scheme to meet banking needs that were intensified after 
the fall of Lehman Brothers. A 2009 report from Danmarks Nationalbank elaborates on this 
disappointment, noting that the loan-bill scheme “assume[d] that the banking institutions 
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want to lend to each other,” however, “confidence among the banking institutions weakened 
during the summer of 2008 as the scope of the problems in the financial sector became more 
apparent” (Financial Stability 2009, 1st half, 19).   
The purpose of the excess-capital facility in particular was to prevent banking institutions 
with adequate capital from incurring liquidity problems as a result of insufficient assets that 
could be pledged as collateral to Danmarks Nationalbank. Unlike the loan-bill scheme, the 
solvency scheme was meant to help institutions access loans raised directly from Danmarks 
Nationalbank—not from other banks. To achieve this, the excess-capital facility allowed 
Danmarks Nationalbank to offer uncollateralized credit in the form of credit lines, the value 
of which depended on the applying institutions’ excess capital adequacy (Financial Stability 
2009, 1st half, 20). As was the case in the loan-bills scheme, this was a seven-day loan.  
2. Banks and mortgage-credit institutes were eligible to participate.  
3. For the excess-capital facility, the credit line was calculated as an institution’s 
excess capital adequacy less a margin of one percentage point.  
The usual limit was DKK800 million.  
4. The interest rate for the excess-capital facility changed over time.  
If an institution chose to exercise the credit commitment, it had to pay an interest rate 
corresponding to Danmarks Nationalbank’s lending rate plus a premium. The interest rate 
was initially fixed as Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus two percentage 
points. On March 13, 2009, the interest was reduced to Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual 
lending rate plus one percentage point, a decision driven by a general downward trend in 
interest rates. On April 8, 2010, the interest rate was changed a third and final time to 
Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus two percentage points, to come into effect 
on October 1, 2010. 
5. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority stated that excess-capital credit lines 
may be included as part of an institution’s statutory liquidity, cf. Section 152 of the 
Danish Financial Business Act, until one month before the expiry of each respective 
facility.   
Some financial institutions used the excess-capital credit lines to help with their statutory 
liquidity requirements by increasing their excess liquidity cover. Figure 1 shows how the 
excess-capital facility contributed to increasing the institutions’ excess liquidity cover. The 
chart is based on liquidity reporting by the institutions to Danmarks Nationalbank and the 
Danish Financial Supervisory Authority. The chart illustrates the excess liquidity cover—
with and without Danmarks Nationalbank’s temporary facilities—of banking institutions 
from Denmark’s groups 1-3 (with group 1 containing the largest banks and group 3 
containing the smallest) (Financial Stability 2010, 65-66). The chart shows that 34 of the 35 
institutions with credit lines under the solvency scheme improved their excess liquidity ratio 
by about 50 percentage points on average (middle bars). 
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Figure 1: Statutory Excess Liquidity Cover for Danish Banks in Groups 1, 2, and 3, with and 
without Danmarks Nationalbank’s Temporary Liquidity Facilities 
 



























Figure 2: Danish Financial Supervisory Authority Banking Institutions in Groups 1 and 2 
 
Source: Danish Financial 2009 (Financial Stability 2010, 14, Box 1) 
6. The excess-capital credit facility was extended twice before expiring.  
The excess-capital credit facility was initially set to expire on January 30, 2009. On October 
7, 2008, it was extended until September 30, 2010. On April 8, 2010, the facility was further 
extended until February 26, 2011. On February 26, 2011, the credit facility on the basis of 
excess capital adequacy expired. 
III. Evaluation  
The excess-capital facility, like Denmark’s other temporary credit facilities, was not widely 
used (Carstensen 2011, 108). The Danish government attributed this lack of temporary 
credit facilities usage to the success of the Original Guarantee Scheme under Bank Package I. 
Officials claim that because of the October 2008 government guarantee under the Bank 
Rescue Package I, “banking institutions started lending to each other in the money market 
again, and the need to borrow from Danmarks Nationalbank [became] modest” (FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 2009, 1st half, 21). The 2009 report continues to note that this was part of a 
broader trend where securities eligible as part of the temporary expanded collateral base 
were not used. Although the temporary facilities (and corresponding expanded collateral 
policies) were supposed to help Danish institutions meet solvency requirements through 
alternative collateral, the use of these unconventional collateral types was limited. Of the 
total DKK332 billion in assets pledged as collateral to Danmarks Nationalbank by the end of 
April, usual eligible assets continued to account for the vast majority of the assets pledged as 
collateral for loans from Danmarks Nationalbank.   
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Some have argued that the temporary credit facilities in general had limited usage because 
Denmark was simultaneously experiencing a currency crisis. The combination of not being a 
Eurozone member and having a fixed exchange rate regime may have led to high demand for 
euro and dollar liquidity by Danish banks and increasing pressure on the Danish krone (Woll 
2014, 158). As a result, monetary policy instruments used by the Danish central bank were 
simply not as significant to supporting the banking industry as in the United States or United 
Kingdom (Woll 2014, 158).  
Regardless, the International Monetary Fund has noted that compared to the first temporary 
liquidity facility—the loan-bills scheme—the excess-liquidity facility was a “more direct 
interventio[n]” (p. 12). In addition, the Financial Stability 2009, 1st half, report claims that 
the excess-capital schemes may have contributed to capping the borrowing rates (21).   
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